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Employment Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Trageser
v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc.'—The Libbie Rehabilitation Center (Lib-
bie), a private corporation that operated a nursing home in Richmond, Vir-
ginia, received substantial income for patient care from Medicare, Medicaid,
Veterans Administration, and welfare payments from both the state and fed-
eral governments.' The nursing home hired Novella Trageser as a registered
nurse in 1971 and promoted her to director of nurses in 1975." Trageser
suffered from retinitis pigmentosa, a hereditary and progressive disease that
impaired her eyesight. 4
The Virginia Department of Health periodically inspected the nursing
home. 5
 On April 28, 1976, during a regular inspection, the certification of-
ficer commented to the administrator of the home that Trageser's eyesight
had deteriorated since the last inspection, and asked what the home intended
to do about it.' The administrator communicated this conversation to the
board of directors, which resolved at its June 7, 1976 meeting to dismiss
Trageser,' Upon learning of this decision, Trageser resigned."
Trageser sued the nursing home in federal district court, 9 seeking
reinstatement, back pay, and an injunction prohibiting the nursing home
from receiving federal financial assistance until she was rehired.'" She al-
leged that she was terminated" because of her disability,'' in violation of the
fifth" and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution,' 4
 42 U.S.C. § 1983,'•
and section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 1"
' Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979).
2 590 F.2d at 87-88.
3 Id.
4 Id .
Id.
6 Id .
Id.
8 Id.
" Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 424 (F.D. Va. 1977).
1 " Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 3-4, Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilita-
tion Center,. Inc., 590 F,2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979).
" Bot.h the district court and the court of appeals implicitly characterized
Trageser's termination by resignation as a constructive discharge. See 590 F.2d at 88.
" See 462 F. Supp. at 425.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. V. It states in part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." Id.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. It states in part: "No state shall ... deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without clue process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. §
15
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
1 " 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). That provision states:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ...
1178
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In deciding the case, the district court First considered whether state ac-
tion necessary to sustain a claim under the Fifth and fourteenth amendments
and section 1983 was present. 17 The court concluded that neither the regula-
tion of the home by the state, nor the receipt of federal funding constituted
state action," and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss." Turning to
the section 504 complaint, the court considered whether the nursing home
was a "program or activity receiving federal Financial assistance"" so as to fall
within the provision's proscription of discrimination. 21 The court failed to
define "Federal financial assistance," but reasoned that the federal funds re-
ceived by the home constituted payment for services rendered rather than
"Federal financial assistance."'" Consequently the court dismissed the section
504 complaint as well."
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of Trageser's claims. 24 The court agreed with the dis-
trict court that neither government regulation of the nursing home nor the
receipt by the home of Medicaid, Medicare, and Veterans Administration
funds was sufficient to constitute the state action necessary to sustain a claim
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution
and section 1983. 2 '' The appellate court arrived at the same result as the
lower court regarding the section 504 claim,'" but it relied upon a different
rationale. It held that a private action to redress employment discrimination
could be maintained under section 504 only when a primary objective of the
federal financial assistance was.to provide employment. 27 Since Trageser was
unable to assert that the federal funding received by the nursing home was
aimed at providing employment, the court dismissed her section 504 claim."
Trageser is significant because it is the first case to hold that an individual
must allege that the primary purpose of federal financial assistance is to pro-
vide employment. in order to maintain a cause of action under section 504. 29
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Id.
' 7 462 F. Supp. at 425-26.
' 8 Id. at 426.
'' Id. (by implication).
2" 29 U.S.C.	 794 (1976), cited in 462 F. Supp. at 426.
21 462 F. Supp. at 426.
22 Id. The court made an analogy to a federal judge who received a monthly fed-
eral salary check. Id. In the court's view, this payment would be compensation for
performing the duties of a judge rather than federal financial assistance. Id. The court
seemed to be interpreting the term "federal financial assistance" as involving the sub-
sidization of a program or activity rather than direct payment for services provided.
23 Id. (by implication).
24 590 F.2d 87, 90 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979).
2 ' Id. at 90.
2" Id. at 89-90.
27 Id. at 89.
Id. at 89-90,
211 In Whitaker v. Board of Higher Education, 461 F. Supp. 99, 101, 106-07
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), the court found a private right of action under section 504 for a
university professor who alleged that he was denied tenure because he was an al-
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If the Trageser court's opinion is followed by other circuits, 30 it would drasti-
cally curtail the remedies available to individuals charging employment dis-
coholic. The court did not require the plaintiff to show that the primary purpose of
the federal funding received by the university was to provide employment. In Davis v.
Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 798 (E.D. Pa. 1978), the court ruled that Philadelphia's
blanket refusal to hire former drug addicts constituted a section 504 violation. The
court did not distinguish between plaintiffs who applied for jobs funded under the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, 29 U.S.C. § 841-851 (1976) (CETA),
and those who applied directly to city departments. 451 F. Supp. at 794, 797. While
funding for CETA does meet the criterion of the Trageser court, that federal financial
assistance must primarily serve to provide employment, there is no indication in the
Davis opinion that all of the allegedly discriminatory programs operated by the city did
satisfy the Trageser standard. In Simon v. St. Louis County Police Dep't, 14 E. P. D.
5440, 5441 (ED, Mo. 1977), the court dismissed the complaint of a paraplegic whose
handicap resulted from an injury sustained while employed as a police officer, and
who reapplied for his former position with reasonable accommodations f or his hand-
icap. The court ruled that the plaintiff must aver that the particular job category in
which he was allegedly subject to discrimination was a program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance. Id. at 5441. However, the court was not faced with the
issue of whether the federal funding received in the particular job category must be
designated specifically for employment purposes.
The plaintiff in Duran v. City of Tampa. 430 F. Supp. 75, 76 (M.D. Fla. 1977)
alleged that he was denied employment with the Tampa Police Department because of
a childhood history of epilepsy. Although the court denied his injunction on other
grounds, id. at 79, the court held that the plaintiff had a meritorious claim under
sections 503 and 504. Id. at 78. The court did not inquire into the purposes of the
federal funding received by the police department..
In Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1977), an
epileptic brought an action against a hospital, under sections 503 and 504, alleging
that she was denied employment because of her handicap. Although the court ruled
that the plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before she was entitled to judi-
cial relief, id. at 816-18, the court asserted that section 504 was indeed concerned with
employment. Id. at 815 n.6. The court found that "contrary to the defendants' conten-
tion, both sections [503] and [504] are concerned with employment. The general pur-
poses of the Rehabilitation Act are set forth in 29 § 701(8) and include the
promotion and expansion of employment opportunities in the public and private sec-
tor." Id. Finally in Gurmankin v. Costanza 4 ll F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556
F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), a case factually analogous to Trageser, the court considered
the claim of a blind woman seeking a teaching position that the hiring practices of the
Philadelphia School System discriminated against visually handicapped persons in vio-
lation of section 504. In upholding her claim on other grounds, id. at 991-92, the court
stated that the refusal to hire a blind person as a teacher was the kind of discrimina-
tion which section 504 was intended to prohibit. Id. at 989.
3" In the first post-Trageser case which examined the 1978 amendments outside of
the Fourth Circuit, the district court declined to follow the Fourth Circuit's reasoning.
Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Stipp. 66, 72 (N.D. Cal. 1979). The plaintiff, a
controlled epileptic, alleged that he was denied employment as a counselor by the
Alameda County Probation Department solely because of his handicap. Id. at 67. In
rejecting the holding of the Trageser court, the Hart court first concluded that the
section 604 limitations clause did not curtail private suits, but only applied to actions
by departments or agencies. Id. at 72. Second, the court found that the Trageser inclu-
sion of the section 604 limitation in any event was contraindicated by the legislative
history of the 1978 Amendments which showed an intent. to expand the remedies
available under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. Finally, the court. rejected the Trageser
court's reasoning that, in failing to apply the remedies of title VII to section 504,
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crimination against employers who receive federal funds." Furthermore,
employers easily could circumvent the reach of section 504 by omitting re-
quests for the funding of staff positions from their applications for federal
financial assistance since, under the Trageser decision, employment discrimina-
tion against handicapped individuals is only actionable where a primary objec-
tive of the federal financial assistance is to provide employment. 32 Even if
not all federally funded programs within an institution excluded staff positions
by grant manipulation, the anomalous situation would exist that within the
same institution, certain employees would have a judicial remedy against
employment discrimination, while other similarly situated individuals would
have no source of relief. 33
This casenote will focus upon the Trageser court's holding that handi-
capped individuals claiming employment discrimination have a right of action
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act only if they can show that their
employers received federal financial assistance in order to provide
employment. It will analyze separately the two fundamental conclusions of law
upon which this holding was founded: (1) that this interpretation is mandated
under the 1978 amendment of the Rehabilitation Act, which provides to sec-
tion 504 complainants the remedies, procedures and rights set forth in title
VI of the Civil Rights Act. of 1964;" and (2) that the 1978 amendment may
be applied retroactively because it merely confirms, rather than alters, the rem-
while making these procedures applicable to section 501, Congress meant to provide
limited relief for employment discrimination under section 504. Id. at 72-73.
But see Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity, 21 F.•.P. Cas. 1077, 1078 (Colo. App. 1979),
in which the court held that an epileptic, denied employment at a hospital receiving
federal financial assistance, had no cause of action under section 504 because Medicaid
and Medicare funds received by the hospital were for the purpose of reimbursing
patients' hospital bills, rather than for providing employment.
31 In September, 1977, the director of HEW's Office for Civil Rights testified that.
to date 70% of the section 504 complaints which his office received involved employ-
ment discrimination. Implementation of Section 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 303 (1977) (statement of David Tatel). In fiscal year 1978. 640 of
the 1,363 complaints registered with HEW by handicapped individuals alleged
employment discrimination. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on petition
for certiorari at 5 n.6, Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979). The Office for Civil Rights had no infor-
mation regarding the number of complainants who could allege that the primary pur-
pose of the federal funding received by their employers was to provide jobs.
32 590 17.2d at 89.
33 While some institutions operate a single program funded by only one federal
agency, others run many semi-autonomous activities funded by multiple grants. Many
large universities even operate multiple campuses. The court in Board of Pub. Instruc-
tion v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969), considered this issue of separate grants as
it applied to a school system which had its funding terminated under title VI of the
Civil Rights Act. The court held that funding should only be terminated for the par-
ticular discriminatory program. Id. at 1078-79. The court noted that "there will also be
cases from time to time where a particular program, within a state, within a county,
within a district, even within a school ... is effectively insulated from otherwise unlaw-
ful activities. Congress did not intend that such a program suffer for the sins of
others." ht. at 1078.
34 590 F.2d at 89.
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edies Congress intended when it originally enacted section 504. 3 '' Toward
this end the casenote first will offer a brief introduction to the Rehabilitation
Act and to other provisions upon which section 504 is based. Then this note
will review in detail the reasoning contained in the Fourth Circuit's decision.
Following this examination, the note will consider the legislative history of the
1978 amendment, and will question the assumptions made by the Trageser
court. concerning the incorporation of the title VI remedies, procedures, and
rights. Similarly, this note will examine the language and legislative history of
section 504 as originally enacted. It will be demonstrated thereby, that, con-
trary to the holding of the Trageser court, the only plausible interpretation of
section 504 as it existed prior to the 1978 amendment is that it broadly pro-
hibited employment discrimination against disabled persons by recipients of
federal financial assistance regardless of the primary purpose of the federal
funding. Finally, an alternative explanation to that espoused by the Trageser
court will be submitted. Specifically, it will be proposed that a better reading
of the 1978 amendment is that it serves to codify existing administrative prac-
tice and to assure administrative due process in the enforcement of section
504. It. will be argued that. this interpretation is more consistent with the re-
medial intent of the Rehabilitation Act and the 1978 amendment, and would
avoid the practical problems raised by the Trageser position.
1. Tut: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 504
Legislation to provide rehabilitation services to disabled civilians was first
enacted by Congress in 1920." It authorized the provision of' training, coun-
seling, and placement. services to physically handicapped individuals." 7
Throughout the next 53 years rehabilitation services were expanded in order
to better meet the needs of a widening spectrum of persons."" The Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 replaced previous vocational rehabilitation legislation then
expiring.°' The 1973 act modified and extended the system of grants to
states to provide rehabilitation services and authorized programs to conduct
research, to solve rehabilitation problems, to assist in the construction of re-
habilitation facilities, to promote and expand employment opportunities, and
to surmount obstacles caused by architectural and transportation barriers.'"
Most of the provisions of title V of the Rehabilitation Act., of which sec-
tion 504 is a part, are aimed at combatting discrimination against handi-
capped persons:" Section 504 in broad terms prohibits discrimination by
recipients of federal financial assistance. 42
 The language of' section 504 is iden-
3:: hi.
31' S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2076, 2082 (discussing Smith-Fess Act of June 2, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-236, 41
Stat. 735 (1920)).
7 hi .
:th Id. at 9-11, reprinted in [1973] U.S. Cons: CoNG. & An. NEWS at 2082-84.
"" Pub. L. No. 90-391, 82 Stat. 297, was enacted in 1968 and extended until June
1972. S. REP, No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS 2076, 2084,
4 " 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
29 U.S.C. §§ 790 to 794 (1976).
4.2 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). See note 14 supra for full text.
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tical to that contained in section 601 of the 'Civil Rights Act of 1964," except.
that section 504 is aimed at discrimination on the basis of disability, rather
than race, color or national origin. Other nondiscrimination provisions of the
Rehabilitation Act mandate federal agencies to design affirmative action pro-
grams for the hiring, placement, and promotion of handicapped persons"
and require contractors doing 'business with the federal government to take
affirmative action to employ and advance qualified handicapped individuals."
In 1977, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
promulgated regulations pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.4 " These regulations prohibit discrimination by recipients of funds inter
alia, employment,'" health care," welfare," and social services." In order to
provide a method of administering and enforcing the regulations, HEW
adopted the procedural provisions of title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 5 '
In 1978, the Rehabilitation Act was amended. 52 Among other changes,
the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in tide VI of the Civil Rights
Act were made available to individuals alleging discrimination under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 53
 The remedies, procedures, and rights relat-
43 42 U.S.C, § 2000d (1976). The Civil Rights Act, inter alia, outlaws discrimination
in places of public accommodation, authorizes the Attorney General to initiate civil
actions against school boards maintaining segregated schools, and establishes proce-
dures for redressing employment discrimination. Title VI of the Act contains provi-
sions relating to the prohibition of discrimination in federally assisted programs. The
broad language of section 601 is qualified by section 604, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3, which
states that a department or agency is not authorized to act with respect to the
employment practices of a funding recipient unless the primary objective of the fed-
eral financial assistance is to provide employment. Section 2000e-2 of title VII pro-
hibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Section 504 also mirrored the wording of section 901 of the Education
Amendments of 1972, which prohibited sex discrimination in education programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). The Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 authorize the extension of appropriations for higher educa-
tion and occupational education and include various other amendments to acts related
to elementary and secondary education.
" 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976).
46
 45 C.F.R. Part 84 (1979).
" 45 C.F.R.§ 84.11(a) (1979).
48 45 C.F.R. § 84.51 (1979).
45i
50
'' 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1979).
52
 Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a).
Prior to the 1978 amendment, the Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1974. Rehabilita-
tion Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617.
53 Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat.. 2955 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §
794a(2)). The amendment provides in part:
The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or
failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of
such assistance under section 504 of this Act.
Id.
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ing to employment discrimination by the federal government contained in
title VII of the Civil Rights Act were made available to individuals alleging
discrimination under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act."
The effect of the 1978 amendment upon the interpretation of section 504
is the subject of this note. One view is that. the incorporation of title VI was
aimed at clarifying the congressional intent that section 504, when originally
enacted, was narrow in scope. Under this reading of the amendment, a dis-
abled person could maintain a cause of action under section 504 only when
federal financial assistance was aimed at providing employment. The difficulty
with this interpretation is that if Congress was in some way displeased with
the manner in which HEW and the courts were construing section 504, it is
puzzling that it did not explicitly state its dissatisfaction. A second interpreta-
tion is that the 1978 amendment, served to codify HEW's enforcement proce-
dures and to guarantee administrative consistency in the methods used by
HEW to ensure compliance with nondiscrimination provisions. This view of
the 1978 amendment would not impose any limitation upon the scope of sec-
tion 504. Because the HEW regulations already adopted the procedural provi-
sions of title VI, however, it would seem unnecessary to enact a statute to that
effect. In Trageser, the Fourth Circuit. was faced with the problem of constru-
ing the 1978 amendment. and ultimately concluded that the amendment. nar-
rowed rather than ratified HEW practices.
II. RATIONALE OF THE COURT: NARROWING SECTION 504
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a disabled individual
could maintain a cause of action for employment discrimination under section
504 only when the employer is receiving federal financial assistance aimed at
providing employment.'''' In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned
that the 1978 amendment's incorporation of the remedies, procedures, and
rights of title VI resulted in the engrafting of a title VI limitation upon the
broad scope of the nondiscrimination language of section 504."
The court began its consideration of Trageser's section 504 claim by not-
ing that the section had been amended in 1978 to provide that any person
aggrieved by a recipient of federal financial assistance could obtain redress by
utilizing the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 57 Therefore, in order to determine what remedies, pro-
cedures, and rights were in fact available to handicapped persons, the court
examined the provisions of title VI. 58 The court noted that the broad lan-
guage of section 601 of title VI, which prohibited discrimination on the basis
51 Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §
794a(1)).
55 Trageser, 590 F.2d at 88.
5" Id.
57 Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (to he codified at 29 U.S.C. §
794a(2)).
" 590 F.2d at 88.
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of race, color, or national origin by recipients of federal financial assistance'
is narrowed by section 604, which authorizes federal departments or agencies
to terminate federal funding or to take other action only when the primary
objective of the federal financial assistance is to provide employment." While
the express language of section 604 only refers to the acts of departments or
agencies, the Trageser court ruled that section 604 similarly curtails private
suits."' The court therefore decided that an individual could seek redress for
employment discrimination under title VI only when the employer is receiv-
ing federal assistance for the primary purpose of creating jobs or when dis-
crimination in employment necessarily causes discrimination against the pri-
mary beneficiaries of the federal aid." 2
The court held that under the statutory scheme established by the 1978
amendment., the limitation on actions for employment discrimination con-
tained in section 604 of title VI of the Civil Rights Act applies to section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act."" In reaching this decision, the court reasoned that
Congress must have intended to limit the remedies of handicapped private
sector employees because the 1978 amendments specifically made available to
handicapped federal employees the remedies, procedures and rights of title
VII, rather than title VI."' The distinction between these two titles is that
title VII is aimed specifically at employment, while title VI contains the
section 604 limitation narrowing that title's applicability to employment dis-
crimination. Thus, if Congress had not intended the section 604 restriction to
apply, it could have applied title VII to private sector discrimination under
section 504 as it had done with federal employees." 5 The court concluded
that, in differentiating between the relief made available to federal employees
under section 501 and the relief made available to employees of private in-
stitutions receiving federal assistance under section 504, Congress must have
intended that the limitation on actions for employment contained in section
604 of the Civil Rights Act be incorporated into section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act."
59 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1076).
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976). That section states:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action
under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any
employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor or-
ganization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to
provide employment.
Id. (emphasis supplied). See Whitaker v. Board of Higher Education, 461 F. Supp, 99,
107-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), which states that termination of kderai assistance is the prin-
cipal means of effecting compliance under title VI.
"' 590 F.2d at 89.
"2 Id. The court cited Caulfield v. Board of Education, 583 F.2d 605 (2d Cir.
1978), and United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 883
(5th Cir. 1966), in support of its holding that a judicial remedy existed under title VI
when employment discrimination caused discrimination against the primary ben-
eficiaries of federal assistance. 590 F.2d at 89 n.7.
"" 590 F.2d at 89.
'' Id.
'° Id.
ill Id
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Having decided the effect of the 1978 amendment, the court next turned
to the issue of whether the amendment was applicable retroactively to
Trageser's 1976 dismissal." The court observed that as a general rule, the
law existing at the time of the court's decision rather than the law at the time
of the incident should be applied to determine the outcome of a civil suit,
unless manifest injustice would result, or a statutory directive or legislative
history existed indicating a different intent." In the absense of legislative
history to the contrary, the court reasoned.that the 1978 amendment merely
clarified the scope of section 504 as originally enacted. 6 " Because, in the
court's view, the amendment changed no rights, the court concluded that it
would be fair to apply the amendment to determine the extent of a private
cause of action . to redress a prior injury:74
 Since Trageser had not alleged
and could not claim that. the federal funding received by the nursing home
was aimed primarily at providing employment:" the court dismissed her sec-
tion 504 complaint."
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT'S RATIONALE
In deciding Trageser, the Fourth Circuit arrived at two important conclu-
sions of law. First, the court held that the 1978 amendment engrafted the
limitations of section 604 of the Civil Rights Act onto section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act and thereby restricted the applicability of section 504 to
employment discrimination cases." Second, the court concluded that the
1978 amendment did not represent a change in the law, but merely clarified
Congressional intent regarding the scope of section 504 as originally
enacted." It is questionable whether the court's interpretation is correct. In
" Id.
"" Id.
?" Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 89-90. The court gave no reason for limiting the relief available under
section 504 to instances of employment discrimination where federal financial assis-
tance was aimed at providing employment rather than holding that a section 504 ac-
tion could also be triggered when discrimination in employment resulted in discrimina-
tion against the primary beneficiaries of the federal aid. See text at note 57 supra.
Thus, the court failed to consider whether the nursing home's dismissal of Trageser
resulted in discrimination against the nursing home's patients. The court of appeals
also did riot discuss the lower court's reasoning that the federal funds received by the
nursing home constituted payment for services rendered rather than federal financial
assistance. See text arid notes at notes 18-21 supra. Thus, it is unclear whether the
court of appeals would adopt such a narrow interpretation. In Bob Jones University v.
Johnson, 396 F. Stipp. 597, 601-04 (D.S.C. 1974), affd men., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir.
1975), the court held that the university was a recipient of federal financial assistance
notwithstanding the argument that the federal cash payments involved went directly to
students eligible for Veterans' Assistance benefits. Analogizing to Trageser, it can be
seen that the nursing home would be considered a recipient of federal financial assis-
tance because the monies are used by the patients to receive medical and nursing care
from the home.
" 590 F.2d at 89.
71 ,rd.
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the following subsection, the court's explanation of Congress' intent in enact-
ing the 1978 amendment will be considered. From this examination, it will be
shown that much of the evidence upon which the court relied may be
explained in an alternative manner. Then, in the subsection thereafter, the
court's conclusion that the 1978 amendment clarified Congress' intent that.
section 504 be construed narrowly will be scrutinized. By reviewing the legisla-
tive history of section 504 and section 601 of the Civil Rights Act, after which
section 504 was modeled, it will be shown that at best there was a wide di-
vergence of opinion regarding the scope of section 504.
A. Title VI v. Title VII
The Fourth Circuit relied upon two assumptions when it concluded that
the 1978 amendment served to confirm a narrow reading of section 504.
First, the Trageser court found it significant that Congress engrafted the title
VI remedies, procedures and rights onto section 504, rather than those pre-
scribed in title VII.'' Second, the court construed section 604 to cover private
suits as well as the actions of departments or agencies." In the subsection
below, it will be shown that the court's treatment of these considerations is
flawed. The selection of title VI remedies, procedures and rights rather than
those available under title VII was logical for reasons other than those offered
by the court. Further, the legislative history of the 1978 amendment evidences
no intent to give a narrow scope to section 504, but instead suggests an ex-
pansive reading. Finally, even if it can be argued that the court was correct in
concluding that the section 604 limitation of employment coverage was incor-
porated into section 504, section 604 seemingly does not apply to private suits
such as Trageser's, but relates only to the actions of departments or agencies.
First, it was logical for Congress to apply the title VI remedies, proce-
dures and rights to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in light of congres-
sional recognition that the language of section 504 tracked the discrimination
prohibitions of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act. 77 Furthermore, HEW's
section 504 regulations already incorporated title VI procedures." On the
other hand, Congressional application of portions of the title VII remedies to
redress violations of section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act followed because the
purpose of those sections of title VII, like section 501, was to redress
employment. discrimination by the federal government. 79 Because section
501 dealt exclusively with employment discrimination, 8 " it was reasonable for
Congress to turn to title VII as a source of relief. Conversely, section 601 of
the Civil Rights Act, encompassing a variety of forms of discrimination, pro-
vided a more logical model for relief under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, which was not limited to employment."
Id.
7 " Id.
77 S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CoNn. &
An. NEW'S 6373, 6390; S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978).
78 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1979).
7 " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976).
"' See, e.g.,Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1286-87 (7th Cit . .
1977) (transportation); Howard S. v. Friendswood Independent School District, 454 F.
1188
	
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 21:1178
Second, the legislative history of the 1978 amendment reveals no intent to
limit the relief afforded disabled persons to the extent decided by the court.
To the contrary, the 1978 amendment was conceived as an attempt to expand
the opportunities of the handicapped" and to assist in the goal of affording
their "full participation" in society." Congress, aware of the difficulties
handicapped individuals faced in obtaining employment, singled out that area
as a source of "unconscionable discrimination.""
Third, even if one of the purposes of the 1978 amendment was to en-
graft the section 604 limitation of the Civil Rights Act onto section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, it is by no means clear, as the Trageser court assumed, that
section 604 restricted the authority of individuals to maintain private ac-
tions." The language of section 604 expressly limited the ability of federal
departments or agencies to terminate funding,"" but was silent concerning
private actions." It would be logical to draw a distinction between the actions
of federal agencies and private individuals in light of the different remedies
each would be likely to pursue." Under title VI the simplest recourse for a
federal department or agency that can not obtain voluntary compliance with
its request to end discriminatory practices is to terminate financial
assistance. 89
 Such an action necessarily would curtail the provision of needed
services to innocent beneficiaries of federal aid. An individual seeking relief
because she was discharged from her job as a result of employment discrimi-
nation, however, presents a different case. Such a person would be likely to
seek relief in the form of reinstatement or back pay, both of which would
Supp. 634, 640 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (education); National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 280, 290-91
(D. Del. 1978) (medical care). See generally Hart v. County of Alameda, supra note 30,
at 72-73.
82 124 CONC. REC. S19,00 1 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Senator Cranston).
" Id, "Provisions in the conference bill such as attorney's fees, certain application
of appropriate civil rights remedies ... should be important steps in our continuing
efforts toward full participation in society by handicapped Americans." Id. When Con-
gress considered the applicability of section 504 to alcoholics and drug abusers, it evi-
denced no intent to limit the section's coverage of employment. 124 CONG. REC.
515,568 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (remarks of Senator Hathaway). During the debate
over an amendment which would have set a ceiling upon the amount of relief available
to handicapped individuals in suits against. the federal government, it was acknowl-
edged that federal grantees, like the federal government, were required to be "equal
opportunity employers. - 124 Coml. RP:c. S15,665-66 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1978) (re-
marks of Senator Cranston).
" 4
 124 CONG. REC. 515,548 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (remarks of Senator Ran-
dolph). He stated; "One of the areas where handicapped Americans have been sub-
jected to unconscionable discrimination, in that they have been unable to secure their
rightful role as independent citizens, has been in the area of employment. - Id.
8' 590 F.2d at 89.
8 " 42 U.S.C.	 2000(1-3 (1976). See note 44 supra for full text.
87 It is now well established that a private cause of action exists under title VI. See
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979).
" See id. at 704-06. The Cannon Court reasoned that title IX, like title VI, sought
to accomplish two objectives. Id. at 704. First, Congress did not want to support dis-
criminatory practices by granting federal funds. Id. Second. Congress wanted to
protect individual citizens against discrimination. Id.
8 " 42 U.S.C.	 2000d-1 (1976). See note 60 supra.
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have a minimal disruptive impact upon the continued operation of federally
funded programs and activities." Thus, by allowing an individual to main-
tain a private action for employment discrimination on the basis of handicap
regardless of the purpose of federal financial assistance, the goals of the Re-
habilitation Act would be realized without disrupting the federal aid pro-
gram."'
B. The Intent of Congress in Initially Enacting Section 504
The Trageser court. stated that no manifest injustice would result from
applying the 1978 amendment to Trageser's 1976 dismissal because the in-
corporation of section 604 of the Civil Rights Act merely confirmed a plausi-
ble reading of section 504 as originally enacted." Thus it was the court's
position that the 1978 amendment did not produce any change in the law.
The court asserted that prior to the enactment of the 1978 amendment, sec-
tion 504 was intended to create a cause of action for employment discrimina-
tion only when the employer received federal funding to create jobs, and that
the 1978 amendment served to clarify this original intent." This narrow
reading of section 504, however, is inconsistent with the stated purpose of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and its legislative history.
The general aim of vocational rehabilitation is to enable handicapped in-
dividuals to work and live independently." It was declared expressly in the
Act's statement of purposes that one of the primary goals of the Rehabilita-
tion Act was to promote the employment of handicapped persons."' Addi-
tionally, although the House and Senate reports accompanying the Rehabilita-
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 704-05. To the extent that
Trageser sought an injunction prohibiting the nursing home from receiving federal
financial assistance until she was rehired, the court correctly denied the relief re-
quested.
" 1 At least one court has concluded that section 604 does not restrict private suits,
but only pertains to the actions of departments or agencies. See Hart v. County of
Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 72 (N.D. Cal. 1979). Other courts considering actions for
employment. discrimination brought by private individuals apparently have ignored
section 604. Afro American Patrolmens League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1974);
Ortiz v. Bach, 14 F.E.P. Cas. 1019 (D. Colo. 1977). But see Feliciano v. Romney, 363 F.
Supp. 656, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Quiroz v. City of Santa Ana, 17 E.P.D. 7218, 7221
(C.D. Cal. 1978).
590 F.2d at 89.
93 Id.
" 4 119 CoNo. REC. 24587 (1973) (remarks of Senator Taft). Although the word
"vocational" was dropped from the short title of the act so as not to exclude severely
handicapped individuals for whom a vocational goal might not be feasible, the focus
of the act remained vocational. S. REP. No. 318, 03d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1973), re-
printed in [1973] U.S. Com; Co a;. & An. News 2076, 2092.
"' 29 U.S.C.	 701 (1976). The text reads "The purpose of this Act is to ... au-
thorize programs to ... (8) promote and expand employment opportunities in the
public and private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such individuals in
employment." hi. See also 119 Coxe. REC. 6145 (I 973) (remarks of Senator Hum-
phrey). He stated: "It is precisely the intent of the present legislation ... to achieve the
central goal of providing vocational services to handicapped individuals to encourage
and enable them to obtain gainful employment." Id.
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tion Act" and the debates in each chamber did not address directly the issue
of the intended scope of section 504, several statements acknowledged that.
discrimination posed a barrier toward the achievement of rehabilitation.
These statements strongly support the view that section 504 extended to
employment discrimination without any implied limitation. Discrimination was
seen as one of the most serious barriers to rehabilitation." Employment
discrimination was highlighted as an obstacle to participation in society by
handicapped persons." Furthermore, it was recognized that handicapped
individuals could not derive full benefit from the vocational rehabilitation
program established by the Act until discrimination was eliminated." The
conclusion that section 504 covers employment without limitation is buttressed
by a Senate report accompanying 1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation
Act,")" which stated that section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination
against all handicapped individuals in relation to federal assistance in inter
alia, "employment, housing, transportation and education.'' "" Viewing these
statements together with the goal of the Rehabilitation Act, the only logical
interpretation of section 504 is that its broad language was intended to pro-
hibit discrimination in employment by federal funding recipients. 102
This reading of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is consistent with
section 601 of the Civil Rights Act, after which it was patterned. 1 U3 A reading
of section 504 to exclude coverage of employment discrimination except when
federal funding is aimed at providing employment is not compelled by either
the express language of section 601 or its legislative history. On its face, the
prohibitory language of section 601 might. well be construed to encompass
employment discrimination.'" Furthermore, there is nothing contained in
S. REP. No. 93-318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H. CONE. REP. No. 93-500, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The House bill (H.R. 8070) was passed in lieu of the Senate
bill (S. 1875) after substituting for its language much of the text of the Senate bill.
[1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & Atr. NEWS 2076.
119 CONG. REC. 24587 (1973) (remarks Of Senator Taft).
"" S. REP. No. 318. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in [1973] U.S. Cone
CONG. & An. News 2076, 2078.
119 CONG, Rec. 24587 (1973) (remarks of Senator Taft). "[1]f we are to assure
that all handicapped persons may participate fully in the rewards made possible by the
vocational rehabilitation program, we must devote more of our energy toward the
elimination of the most disgraceful barrier of all—discrimination." Id.
"(1 Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617
(amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (Stipp. 111 1973)).
11 ' S. REP. No, 1297, 93d Cong., 2c1 Sess. 38 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Cone
Com:. An. NEWS 6373, 6388 (emphasis added).
102
 Civil rights acts are remedial and should be liberally construed to realize their
curative objectives. United States v. El Camino Community College District, 454 F.
Supp. 825, 829 (C.D. Cal. 1978), nffd, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979). The Rehabilita-
tion Act was designed to promote the civil rights of handicapped individuals. 119
CONG. Rec. 6145 (1973) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
113 S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Cone CONG. &
An. NEWS 6373, 639(1,
194
 Because the broad language of section 601 is narrowed by section 604, courts
have not been faced with the issue of interpreting section 601 when deciding cases
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, courts interpreting the nearly identical
language of section 504 of the Rehabilitation act prior to the Trageser decision, uni-
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the legislative history of title VI of the Civil Rights Act that would preclude
the view that the language of section 601 encompassed employment discrimi-
finanly have concluded that it encompassed employment discrimination. See text and
note at note 29 supra. On the other hand, the enacting Congress and the courts that
have interpreted the language of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976), which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs receiving federal financial
assistance, have been divided as to whether it encompasses employees regardless of the
purpose of the federal aid. Compare 118 CoNG. REC. 5803, 5807, 5812 (1972) (remarks
of Senator Bayh); Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art. 426 F. Supp. 779, 780-81 n.I
(NI), Ohio 1976) (title IX provides cause of action for a woman alleging denial of
employment because of sex discrimination who was seeking a job as a guard in a
museum receiving federal assistance for its education program); with McCarthy v. Burk-
holder, 448 F. Supp. 41, 42-44 (D. Kan. 1978) (teacher alleging discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy in school system receiving federal funds has no valid claim under
title IX); Romeo Community Schools v. United States Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1021 (F.D. Mich. 1977), affd, 600 Eat 581 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). In Romeo the district court concluded that the
language of title IX did not include employment. 438 F. Supp. at 1032. The court
held:
Teachers participate in these programs only to the extent that they may
teach and help administer some of them; teachers benefit from these pro-
grams only to the extent that the funds for them may be used to pay their
salaries; teachers arc "subjected to discrimination under" these programs
(emphasis added), only to the extent that the programs themselves may be
established and operated in an employment-related discriminatory way.
Teachers, in short. are hard pressed to fit themselves within the plain
meaning of § 168 l's prohibitory language, general as it may appear on its
face.
Id. at 1031-32.
Similarly, the court in lslesboro School Committee v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426
(1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Harris v. Islesboro School Committee, 444 U.S. 972
(1979), decided that the title 1X language excluded most employment. The court sin-
gled out that part of the statutory language referring to individuals receiving the ben-
efits of programs or activities, 593 F.2d at 426, and seemingly ignored the rest of the
provision which includes program participants and individuals suffering discrimination
under federally funded activities. The court said that: "The language ... on its face, is
aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal monies  Id. See also Kuhn, Title IX;
Employment and Athletics Are Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 Gro. L.J. 49, 56-62 (1976)
(legislative history supports view that title IX does not cover employment).
It may be speculated whether the courts which held that title IX did not include
employment discrimination would have analyzed the language in the same way if no
other remedies were available. See, e.g., Romeo Community Schools v. United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 438 F. Stipp. at 1034: "An even more
persuasive indication that Congress did not intend to regulate employment practices
under § 1681 is the fact that Congress specifically provided for such regulation under
both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act else in the very same legislation." Id,
Even if the language of title IX is interpreted to preclude coverage of employees
except when the primary purpose of federal funding is to provide employment. the
same meaning need not he ascribed to section 504. The Education Amendments, un-
like the Rehabilitation Act, were not aimed primarily at redressing employment needs.
While it is a general rule of statutory construction that when two statutes are enacted
for like purposes, similar terms contained in each should receive the same interpreta-
tion, Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, 323 F.2d 566. 571 (4th Cir.
1963): Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States. 156 F.2c1 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1946), this
rule is not to be applied blindly. United Shoe Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Bedell,
506 F.2d 174, 188 (1).C. Cir. 1974). Even related pieces of legislation must be
examined fur the purposes which they serve. Id. When statutes which relate to the
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nation regardless of the purpose of federal financial assistance. Indeed, it ap-
pears that there was substantial confusion as to the scope of section 601.' 65
While some spokesmen for the Act claimed that section 601 would not affect
the employment practices of individual federal beneficiaries,'" other Con-
gressmen asserted that the plain language of' section 601 encompassed dis-
crimination in employment in programs financed by the federal govern-
ment.'" Because of the confusion regarding the section's coverage of
employment discrimination, it was necessary to add section 604 in order to
clarify the scope of section 601. 10 k
Significantly, a limitations section similar to section 604 was not included
in the Rehabilitation Act. From this omission it is reasonable to assume that
Congress did not intend originally to apply the section 604 limitation to sec-
tion 504."9 In light of the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act to promote
same subject matter have significantly different purposes, then they are not to be read
in part materia. Id. Courts generally interpret the language of civil rights statutes
broadly, when determining such questions as which individuals were meant. to he pro-
tected. See, e.g., Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971).
Limitations on rights granted under civil rights acts are 10 be narrowly construed.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company, 408 F.2c1 228. 232 (5th
Cir. 1969); Pullen v. Otis Elevator Company, 292 F. Supp. 715, 717 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
The Pullen court stated that "[iln construing a remedial statute, it is felt that limitations
which would take away a right from one for whom the statute was passed must be
express and not subject to varying interpretations." Id. at 717.
105 11 was not until section 604 was introduced as part of the Dirksen-Mansfield
amendments, Amend. No. 656 to H.R. 7152, 110 CoNG. Rite. 11926, 11930 (1964),
some months after the formulation of section 601, that the relation of title VI to
employment was stated definitively.
1 " See, e.g., 110 CONG. Rtc. 1521 (1964) (remarks of Representative Geller); 110
CoNG. REc. 7060 (1964) (remarks of Senator Pasture).
117 See, e.g., Hearings on H. R. 7152 Before the House Comm, on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 379 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Porn; id. at 504 (remarks of Rep. Cramer).
L 0 " In response to an inquiry by Senator Cooper, Attorney General Robert Kennedy
stated that section 601 was limited to discrimination against the beneficiaries of federal
assistance programs so that it would apply to employment practices only when
employees were the intended beneficiaries of federal aid. 110 CONC. REG. 19976
(1964). The attorney general did not address the remainder of the language of section
601 which referred to individuals suffering from "discrimination uncle!' programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance. It may be interpreted that he thought
that the phrase was synonymous with the language referring to beneficiaries. Not-
withstanding this response, Senator Cooper feared that tide VI would be used to en-
force Title VII and introduced an amendment that would prohibit action under title
VI when title VII was also applicable. Amend. No. 604, 110 CoNG. REC. 11225-26
(1964) (remarks of Senator Cooper). Senator Humphrey acknowledged that title VI
might require the elimination of racial discrimination in the employment of teachers,
doctors. or nurses, although he denied that it would affect the employment practices
of recipients of direct assistance payments such as veterans benefits or social security. Id.
at 6545-46.
1 " See General Elec. Co. v. Southern Constr. Co., 383 F.2d 135, 138 n.4 (5th Cir.
1967); City of Port Hueneme v. City of" Oxnard, 52 Cal. 2d 385, 395, 341 P.2d 318,
324 (1959). "Where a statute, with reference to uric subject contains a given provision,
the omission of such a provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject
shows that a clifferent intention existed." Id. (quoting People v. Town of Corte Mad-
era, 97 Cal. App. 2d 726, 729, 218 Pfd 810, 813 (1959)).
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employment and to afford the disabled full participation in society, it is plaus-
ible to conclude only that section 504, as originally enacted, was intended to
prohibit employment discrimination against disabled individuals regardless of
the purpose of federal financial assistance.
IV. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE 1978 AMENDMENT
An alternative interpretation of the purpose and effect of the 1978
amendment to that espoused by the Trageser court is that the amendment was
designed to promote administrative consistency and to assure administrative
clue process by engrafting the remedies, procedures, and rights of title VI
onto section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act."'
Section 504 as originally enacted did not specifically require the promul-
gation of regulations and did not detail enforcement procedures."' Neverthe-
less, Congress expressed the belief that a compliance mechanism should be
created.' Envisioned was a system, similar to that in effect under title VI of
the Civil Rights Act,"" in which HEW issued regulations governing proce-
dures such as pre-grant analysis of potential funding recipients, investigation
and review of complaints, attempts to achieve voluntary compliance, and im-
position of sanctions." 4
The HEW section 504 regulations were adopted in 1977" 5 pursuant to
executive order.''" The regulations outlined areas in which discrimination
was prohibited, specifically enumerating employment.''' In order to enforce
section 504, the regulations incorporated the procedural provisions of title VI
covering, inter alia, the conduct of investigations, the requirements for hear-
ings, and the method of terminating federal financial assistance.'"
"I" S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978). "[A]pplicat.ion of the provisions
relating to discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin would
assure administrative due process, and provide for administrative consistency within
the Federal Government." Id.
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2c1 Sess. 39 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 6373, 6390.
12 Id. at 39-40, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS at 6390.
"3 Id.
1 " See Nondiscrimination under Programs Receiving Federal Assistance through the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Effectuation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964, 45 C.F.R. Parts 80-81 (1979).
" 5 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiv-
ing or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 45 C.F.R. Part 84 (1979).
Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1976).
17 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (1979).
11 ' 45 G.F.R. § 84.61 (1979). "The procedural provisions applicable to title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply to this part." Id. The regulations then refer to sections
45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-80.10 and Part 81. Id. The cited sections pertain to compliance in-
formation, id. at § 80.6; conduct of investigations, id. at. § 80.7; procedure for effective
compliance, id. at § 80.8; hearings, id. at § 80.9; decisions and notice, id. at § 80.10;
and practice and procedure for hearings. id. at Part 81. Section 80.8(c) is entitled
"Termination of or refusal to grant or to continue Federal financial assistance." Id. at §
80.8(c). The section limits termination to the specific agency Found to be discriminat-
ory, but does not mention that in cases of employment discrimination the funding
must be for the purpose of providing employment. Id.
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During discussions over the adoption of the 1978 amendment, Congress
indicated its approval of HEW's section 504 regulations. According to the
Senate report, the purpose of the amendment making available the remedies,
procedures, and rights of title VI of the Civil Rights Act was to codify existing
practice.'" That practice included the prohibition of employment discrimi-
nation against handicapped persons regardless of the purpose of federal fi-
nancial aid. 12" Congress implicitly endorsed the HEW section 504 regulations
when it stated that one of its accomplishments was to guarantee that federal
funding recipients would not discriminate against handicapped persons. 12 '
Rather than intending to limit the remedies available to handicapped persons
alleging employment discrimination, as held by the Trageser court, Congress
sought to strengthen the rights of handicapped persons by giving the HEW
regulations the force of a "specific statutory requirement." 122
When interpreting a statute, courts should give deference to the construc-
tion of the administrative agency charged with enforcing it.' 23
 The apparent
position of HEW, that employment discrimination against handicapped per-
sons by recipients of federal financial assistance is prohibited regardless of the
purpose of federal funding, 124
 is entitled to particular respect since Congress
voiced its approval of the HEW regulations in the course of amending section
504. 125
In United States v. City of Chicago, 126
 a district court faced with an analo-
gous question of statutory construction, concluded that a provision in the
State and Local Assistance Act' 27
 incorporating the "powers and functions" of
title VI' 2g
 did not limit substantively the relief available to individuals ag-
grieved under the Act.' 2 " The defendant, the City of Chicago, challenged
" 9 S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2c1 Sess. 19 (1978). "It is the committee's understand-
ing that the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare with respect to procedures, remedies, and rights muter section 504 conform
with those promulgated under title VI. Thus, this amendment codifies existing prac-
tice as a specific statutory requirement." Id.
121) See text and note at note 117 .supra.
121
 124 CoNG. REC. SI
 5,562 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (remarks of Senator Williams).
He stated: With the signing of the regulations implementing section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, this ad-
ministration has assured prohibitions on discrimination for persons with disabilities by
anyone receiving Federal funds." Id.
122 S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2c1 Sess. 19 (1978).
' 23
 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
124 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (1979).
125 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-82 (1969).
"" 395 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. III. 1975), aff(1, 525 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1975).
127 31 U.S.C. ** 1221-1263 (Supp. 111 1973).
128 3 1 § 1242(a) (Stipp. III 1973) provides:
No person in the United States shall on the ground of race, color, national
origin, or sex be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination tinder any program or activity funded in
whole or in part with funds made available under subchapter I of this
chapter.
Id. Subsection (b) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to "exercise the powers and
functions provided by title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964[.]" 31 U.S.C. 1242(b)
(Stipp. III 1973).
"" 395 F. Supp. at 344.
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the withholding of federal revenue sharing funds upon a judicial finding of
employment discrimination in the city police department.'" The State and
Local Assistance Act of 1972 contained wording identical to section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act except that it proscribed discrimination on the basis of race,
national origin, or sex, rather than handicap."' To enforce this provision,
the Act made available the "powers and functions" of tide VI.' 32 The court
rejected the defendant's argument that section 604 of title VI should be in-
corporated into the State and Local Assistance Act so that revenue sharing
funds could be terminated upon a finding of employment discrimination only
when the federal assistance was aimed at. providing employment.' 33 Instead
the court adopted the view that. section 604 would not act as a restraint upon
the relief available under the State and Local Assistance Act.' 34
 According to
the court, the reference to title VI could not be used to .
 restrict the broad
nondiscrimination provision contained in the State and Local Assistance Act,
but merely served to provide an enforcement mechanism.' 35
The interpretation of the City of Chicago court that section 604 of the Civil
Rights Act did not impose a limitation upon the prohibition against discrimi-
nation contained in the State and Local Assistance Act should have been
adopted by the Trageser court in resolving the analogous problem of interpret-
ing the effect of the 1978 amendment upon section 504. The similarities be-
tween the two acts are striking. Both the State and Local Assistance Act and
the Rehabilitation Act contain almost identical language, prohibiting discrimi-
nation by federal funding recipients.'" Moreover, the State and Local Assis-
tance Act and the 1978 amendment suggested that title VI was available' to
individuals experiencing discrimination, implying that title VI should serve as
a supplement to enforcement, rather than as a limitation upon judicial relief.
If Congress had intended to limit relief through the application of title VI, it
is more likely that it would have chosen words stating that each act was "gov-
erned by" or "subject to" the provisions of that title.
CONCLUSION
The holding of the Trageser court, that a handicapped individual alleging
employment discrimination under section 504 has a private right of action
only when the primary purpose of federal funding was to provide employ-
'" Id. at 335-37.
1 ' See text and note at note 128 supra.
132 395 F. Supp. at 343-44.
133 Id. at 344.
134 Id
135 Id .
[36 See note 128 supra.
1"7 395 F. Supp. at 343. See note 53 supra. The State and Local Assistance Act
provided:
[T]he Secretary is authorized (I) to refer the matter to the Attorney Gen-
eral with a recommendation that an appropriate civil action be instituted;
(2) to exercise the powers and functions provided by title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964; or (3) to take such other actions as may be provided by
31 U.S.C. § 1242(b) (1973 Supp.).
But see lslesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 429-30 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.
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ment, would frustrate the purpose of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and read
into the 1978 amendment an intent not demonstrated by its language or legis-
lative history. The incorporation of section 604 of title VI would affect the
rights of disabled individuals by restricting recovery against federal funding
recipients to situations in which federal assistance was aimed at providing
employment. Yet, when Congress incorporated the remedies, procedures, and
rights of title VI of the Civil Rights Act into section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, it meant only to codify existing administrative practice under section 504,
which included the prohibition of discrimination in employment on the basis
of handicap, regardless of the purposes for which federal funding was re-
ceived. The remedies, procedures, and rights referred to in the amendment
are the agency promulgation of regulations, the investigation of violations,
and the conduct of hearings. Accordingly, courts that consider this issue in
the future should be hesitant to adopt the Trageser approach, which runs
counter to the language and legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act.
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denied sob nom. Harris v. Islesboro School Comm., 411 U.S. 972 (1979), wherein the
Court rejecied HEW's argument that the reasoning of City of Chicago could be applied
in a title IX case.
